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An important recent World Trade Organization 
dispute settlement case for many developing countries 
concerned European Union exports of sugar. Brazil, 
Thailand, and Australia alleged that the exports have 
substantially exceeded permitted levels as established by 
European Union commitments in the WTO. This case 
had major implications for both European Union sugar 
producers and developing countries that benefited from 
preferential access to the European Union market. It was 
also noteworthy in the use of economic arguments by 
the WTO dispute settlement panel, which held that the 
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excess sugar exports were in part a reflection of  illegal 
de facto cross-subsidization—rents from production 
that benefited from high support prices being used to 
cover losses associated with exports of sugar to the world 
market. Although in principle the economic arguments 
of the panel could apply to many other policy areas, 
in practice WTO provisions greatly limit the scope 
to bring similar arguments for trade in products that 
are not subject to explicit export subsidy reduction 
commitments of the type that were made for sugar and 
other agricultural commodities. 
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In the early 1970s, the European Community was a net importer of sugar, buying some 
2.5 million tons on the world market. As a result of high intervention prices for sugar – 
averaging more than double the world price since the mid 1980s, and rising to a multiple 
of four in 2000 – production expanded so much that the EC became a net exporter. In the 
late 1990s and early 2000s the EC’s net exports of sugar were in the range of 4 to 5 
million tonnes.  EC policies resulted in the EC becoming a major player on world 
markets: in 2005 it was the 2
nd largest exporter in the world (after Brazil), accounting for 
12 percent of world exports. At the same time, the EC was also the world’s 4
th largest 
importer, an idiosyncrasy that reflects the preferential access granted to African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries under the ACP Sugar Protocol.  
In the Uruguay Round, the EC scheduled export subsidy commitments for sugar 
of  €499 million and 1.2735 million tonnes. In EC-Sugar, Australia, Brazil and Thailand 
argued that the EC provided export subsidies in excess of its WTO export subsidy 
commitment levels for sugar, in part through de facto cross-subsidization of exports as a 
result of guaranteeing high annual intervention (support) prices for a given quantity of 
EC sugar, and in part as the result of re-exporting an amount of sugar equivalent to what 
the EC imported from ACP countries on a preferential basis. The EC argued that re-
exports of ACP sugar were covered by its export subsidy commitments through a 
footnote in its schedule, and that the acceptance of the inclusion of this footnote by WTO 
members implied that its schedule effectively altered its obligations under the Agreement 
on Agriculture (AoA). The EC also held that because WTO members had not previously 
raised objections to exports of so-called “C sugar” as being subsidized, the complainants 
were not acting in good faith and were estopped from invoking dispute proceedings.
1
  We address each of these dimensions of the case in this paper. We start in Section 
1 with a brief description of EC policy and some of its likely effects. Section 2 provides 
an economic and legal analysis of the cross subsidization argument brought by the 
complainants.  Section 3 turns to the consistency of the EC measures with its WTO 
obligations, as well as the estoppel defense argument of the EC. Section 4 discusses the 
                                                 
1 The principle of estoppel is defined in Section 2 below. 
  1finding of the Appellate Body (AB) that the panel erred in its invocation of the principle 
of judicial economy to not address claims that aspects of the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) had been violated.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
1. EC Sugar Policy 
Subsidies play a major role in the EC sugar industry.
2 In 1999-2001, the value of gross 
receipts of sugar producers in the EC was more than double the value of their output 
measured at world prices: the producer nominal assistance coefficient was 2.1. In this 
period, total OECD support for sugar was equivalent to about half of global exports 
($6.35bn compared to $11.6bn), similar in value to the total exports of sugar of all 
developing countries ($6.5bn). The EC accounted for 43 percent of the $6.35bn in OECD 
support for sugar. Much of this support was provided through very high border protection 
– around 90 percent for the EC. 
The EC policy regime for sugar complements high intervention or support prices 
for sugar with production quotas. These are of two types: so-called quota A and quota B. 
The sum of A and B quotas determines the maximum amount of sugar that may be sold 
in the EC market in a given year. All excess production must be exported—if not, 
producers are penalized.
3  Production of A and B sugar benefits from the high 
intervention price in the EC. Excess production by an EC producer over and above its 
A+B quotas does not benefit from the high intervention/support price. In EC speak such 
excess output is called C sugar. Note that there is no physical difference between these 
various categories of sugar; there is one world price for sugar, be it A, B, or C sugar.  
The producer price for A sugar is greater than the producer price received for B 
sugar. Both are less than the basic intervention or support price as a result of a levy that is 
used to finance the export subsidies needed to sell excess production on the world 
market. Thus, producer prices of A and B sugar are endogenous; they are a function of 
how much of B is exported if the sum of A+B quotas exceeds total EC consumption at 
the (fixed) intervention price for sugar. The levy on A sugar is 2 percent, i.e., the 
                                                 
2 Figures in this paragraph are from Mitchell (2005). 
3 However, there is some allowance for carry forward – up to 20% of a firm’s A+B quota per year. 
  2producer price received is 2 percent below the “basic” support price confronting buyers. 
In the case of B output, the levy varies, ranging up to a maximum of 37.5 percent.
4
In addition to (part of) the B quota, the EC also exports an amount of sugar that is 
equal to what it imports from ACP countries under its preferential access program (the 
Cotonou Convention). The total EC import commitment vis-à-vis the ACP is some 1.3 
million tons, although in some years this has been expanded under a special (additional) 
preference program. As a result, the maximum amount imported from the ACP has 
ranged up to 1.6 million tons. Given that EC production exceeds consumption at the 
intervention price, in effect all the ACP sugar is “re-sold” on the world market. Thus, the 
effects of the ACP sugar protocol imports on the EC market are “sterilized” by exporting 
the amount imported.
5 As the ACP sugar is bought at the intervention price, the export 
sales incur a significant loss, which is absorbed by the EC budget (taxpayers). These 
costs are clearly export subsidies, and are recognized as such by the panel and the EC. 
The resulting EC-wide market for sugar is illustrated in Figure 1. Of some 18-20 
million tons of sugar produced per year in the EC, some 15 percent is exported. In 2001 
the EC exported 4.1 million tons: the quantity represented by line segment TW in Figure 
1. However, the EC had only scheduled 1.2735 million metric tons of sugar (line segment 
TU in Figure 1) as being eligible for export subsidies.
6  The excess exports of 2.8 million 
tons were comprised of 1.3 million metric tons of ACP sugar (line segment UV) and 1.5 
million tons of C sugar (line segment VW). Thus, EC exports consist of B quota sugar 
(benefiting from scheduled export subsidies financed by the levy on EC quota 
production) plus the (equivalent of) ACP sugar imports (also benefiting from a direct 
export subsidy, financed by the EC budget) plus C production. Only the latter does not 
benefit from direct export subsidies.  
Two groups finance the sugar scheme: EC consumers of sugar, who pay 2 to 4 
times the world price for sugar, and EC taxpayers (in order to re-export ACP sugar). The 
rest of the world, non-ACP producers that do not benefit from preferential access and 
                                                 
4 The producer price of A sugar would be equal to that of B sugar if there were no exports of B sugar. 
5 The extent to which this is actually a physical re-export of the cane sugar imported, or comprises exports 
of beet sugar is unknown. Some 98.5 percent of total EC output is from sugar beet, whereas ACP sugar 
imports are derived from sugar cane. If sugar is sugar, i.e., is a homogenous product, it does not matter. In 
this paper we assume that sugar is homogenous. 
6 The value of these subsidies was capped in the EC’s WTO commitments at  €499 million. 
  3confront lower world prices as a result of EC subsidization of exports of sugar incur 
losses as a result of the policy.  Two groups gain from the policy: EC and ACP 
producers. As illustrated in Figure 2, the rents EC producers obtain are determined by the 
high producer prices in the EC: Pa for A quota (2 percent less than the support price, and 
Pb for quota B sugar (up to 37.5 percent less than the basic price, illustrated by area “b” in 
Figure 2). The magnitude of the rents depends on the cost functions of producers: the 
more efficient the producer, the greater the rents. This also applies to ACP sugar protocol 
countries that have export quotas into the EC market.  Low cost producers – for 
simplicity, say those that can sell at the world price and cover their costs, will get a rent 
equal to the shaded area in Figure 2: areas A+B+C as a result of the A sugar quota for 
which they get Pa; area D as a result of the B quota (for which they get Pb). A high cost 
producer – with marginal cost schedule MCh in Figure 2, will only obtain a rent equal to 
area A.
7  
A key question in the dispute revolved around what producers do with the rents, 
in particular whether they use them to cross-subsidize production and exports of C sugar. 
A second major issue in the case concerned the total volume of exports of sugar, which 
the complainants argued exceeded the EC’s schedule of export subsidy commitments. 
The following two sections discuss these two dimensions of the dispute. 
 
2.  Cross-Subsidization of C Sugar—Legal and Economic Analysis 
Article 9.1(c) of the AoA defines export subsidies subject to reduction commitments as 
including:  
   “[P]ayments on the export of an agricultural product that are financed by virtue of 
governmental action, whether or not a charge on the public account is involved, 
including payments that are financed from the proceeds of a levy imposed on the 
agricultural product concerned or on an agricultural product from which the 
exported product is derived[.]” 
 The panel found that the measures complained of fell within this provision, because: 1) 
Producers of C sugar were able to purchase C sugar beet at below cost; 2) the EC 
required C sugar to be exported; and 3) the below cost sales were financed through sales 
                                                 
7 This description abstracts from various factors that will determine the incidence of any rents.  In practice 
the rents will be shared with importers/distributors in the case of ACP producers, and with 
processors/refiners in the case of EC producers. 
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regulations. It is clear that the legal theory here is one of cross-subsidization:  above-
normal profits from the sale of one product subsidize the export of another. The panel 
argued that the sugar regime in the EC resulted in cross-subsidization of all EC sugar 
output, including C production that does not benefit from direct subsidies on export and 
is sold at world prices. The basic argument of the panel is that rents on A and B quota 
sugar can be used to cover below cost sales of C output. While in general such a cross-
subsidy need not be an export subsidy, under EC policy if C production is not exported 
(or used under the carry forward provision) it is subject to high financial penalties—thus 
there is a clear incentive to export C sugar. 
From an economic perspective, a key question is why farmers would produce C 
sugar given that it does not benefit from direct support (is sold at the world price). One 
possibility is fixed costs of production (scale economies): more output lowers average 
unit costs, perhaps by enough to make total production profitable if it goes beyond the 
level of A and B output levels. Another possibility is that some EC producers may be 
efficient and able to sell at the world price without incurring losses. A third possibility is 
uncertainty – farmers may plant more than is needed to generate the A+B level of output 
as a form of insurance: to make sure that they will be able to meet long-term contracts 
they have with refiners. As these are very profitable, over planting ensures that if harvests 
are bad they will still be able to fully satisfy their contracts and thus capture all of the 
rents they can make on quota sugar. If harvests are good, however, there will be excess 
production—i.e., C sugar. 
If the world price for C sugar is such that the resulting total average cost of 
production falls because of scale economies – i.e., there are fixed costs/fixed factors – the 
rents derived from quota (A and B) production can be used to cross-subsidize C 
production and enhance profits. Given a level of output B, defined as the maximum 
amount on which firms can get the high support price (more generally the share of output 
on which producers get a subsidy/rent), as long as the world price exceeds the marginal 
costs of producing this level of output, farmers will have an incentive to produce more. 
They will produce up to the point where marginal revenue (determined by the world 
price) equals marginal cost of production. This optimal level of output will exceed the 
  5quota level of sales. In general, De Gorter, Just and Kropp (2007) show that cross-
subsidization is possible for a variety of permutations of production costs, world price 
levels and support prices implied by a quota level B. A number of possible situations 
where cross-subsidization can occur are illustrated in Figures 3-6. These include 
situations where firms make losses at the quota level of output and situations where the 
world price is less than the average variable costs of production.
8
De Gorter, Just and Kropp (2007) note that even if marginal output decisions are 
determined by the world price, and not the quota (support) price, the existence of the 
rents on quota sugar may deter exit and thus result in output that is too high. There may 
also be firms that would be unprofitable producing at quota (support) level B but that 
become profitable by increasing their output at the margin because of the support that is 
offered for output up to level B (see also Figures 3-6). Thus, total output is likely to 
exceed what would be observed under free trade because there are producers in the 
market only because of the subsidy.  
Only if there are producers that can cover their marginal costs at the world price 
without subsidies is there no cross-subsidization. In such cases the EC policy will simply 
be a redistributive one: firms are allowed to capture rents, but they would be in the 
market anyway. A problem in assessing the validity of this possibility is that there is little 
information on costs of production so it is not known to what extent there are such firms 
in the EC. However, the likeliest presumption is that there will only be few such 
producers in the EC. 
Turning to the insurance motive possibility for C production and exports, if there 
is rational overproduction to deal with uncertainty ex ante, Gohin and Bureau (2006) 
show that the cross-subsidy conclusion still applies: the EC quota/support system acts as 
a cross-subsidy in such situations because the likelihood of “overproduction” is a positive 
function of the difference between the EC intervention and the world price. However, 
they also point out that the carry forward provisions of the sugar regime attenuate the 
incentive to overproduce as it allows for quota rights to be transferred to the next year.  
If a more long-run view is taken, the cross-subsidization argument based on fixed 
costs becomes less compelling. Producers should adjust production factors so that these 
                                                 
8 We are grateful to Harry de Gorter (Cornell University) for sharing these graphs. 
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regime has been in place for decades such adjustments should have been made in the 
past. Moreover, they note that it is not clear that there actually are significant scale 
economies in beet production (fixed costs), although the possibility of such costs and 
long-lived assets is more likely for processors/refiners.  These considerations make the 
De Gorter et al. finding that cross-subsidization is not limited to instances where world 
prices are less than average total costs of production more important in bolstering the 
economic argument for cross subsidization. Of particular importance here is the exit 
deterring influence of policies that result in de facto cross-subsidization of exports. 
Thus, it is indeed possible, based on the known facts, that cross-subsidization 
would be an effect of the EC regime. However, it is also conceptually possible that sugar 
producers could decide to do otherwise with the above-normal profits from A and B sales 
than subsidize sales of C beet.
9 As a matter of law then is the requirement of 
governmental action satisfied if the governmental conduct in question will not 
necessarily induce the subsidization complained of? We are inclined to answer in the 
affirmative and thus to support the findings of the panel and the Appellate Body. Art. 
9.1(c) requires only that “payments on the export of an agricultural product” be “financed 
by virtue of governmental action”(emphasis added).  In other words, all that is necessary 
is for the government to have done something “by virtue of which” the payments are 
financially enabled; it is not required to show that the government has mandated or 
caused the payments to be actually made, much less that the governmental action itself is 
in the form of a “payment,” however so defined.  Thus whether such payments are made 
or not might still be at the discretion of non-governmental actors; if they are made and it 
is governmental action that results in the financial capacity to make them, they are 
covered by 9.1(c).  It was not in dispute that the high prices for A and B sugar and sugar 
beet were a consequence, in part if not large part, of the EC regulatory regime.  The 
question then becomes, as a matter of proof, what must the complainant show in order to 
establish below-cost sales of C beet were enabled by the profits generated through these 
                                                 
9 We stress that while it is certainly conceptually possible for producers not to use A+B rents to subsidize 
C production, and that this justifies the legal analysis that follows, the practical relevance of the argument 
for the case at hand is limited as it is premised on alternative uses of these excess profits/rents not 
generating higher returns, be it through investment or consumption. 
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axioms, that, absent above-normal profits on one product, it is simply not viable for to 
sell another product at below-cost?  This would leave it for the defendant to explain how, 
despite the standard economic axioms, in the particular case at hand, the firm would have 
been able to finance the below-cost sales in the absence of the above-normal profits due 
to government influenced or determined above-market prices for other products.    
Certainly, the EC does not seem to have offered a very clear explanation of how the 
behavior in question with respect to C might have occurred anyhow in the absence of 
above-normal A and B profits. 
 
Commentary 
A concern may be raised that, in opening the door to “cross-subsidization” claims the 
Appellate Body has considerably expanded the scope for members to challenge subsidies 
in WTO law, as well, arguably as legally to countervail them.    It is our view that in fact 
there will be limited scope for such claims outside the context of 9.1(c) of the AoA.  The 
SCM Agreement requires that, for a measure to be considered a subsidy, there must be a 
“financial contribution by government” (emphasis added) not merely that a payment (by 
anyone) be financially enabled “by virtue of governmental action.”  The AoA is clearly 
addressed to dealing with the pervasive distortion of competition in agricultural markets 
through the combined and interactive effects of a wide variety of government policies:  
levies, export subsidies, quotas and price support mechanisms.  It is thus understandable 
that “cross-subsidization” would be disciplined by such a comprehensive agreement.  The 
SCM Agreement is more limited, on the other hand:  unlike the case with the EC’s own 
internal law on state aids, the WTO rules on subsidies exist in the absence of agreement 
among WTO Members on anti-trust or competition law principles; indeed whether such 
principles should be part of the WTO system at all is intensely controversial.  The 
definition of “financial contribution” in the SCM Agreement makes clear that there is 
only a very narrow range of circumstances where a “financial contribution” by 
government would exist by virtue of payments through a non-governmental entity:  SCM 
1 provides that a financial contribution exists where “government makes payments to a 
funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or more of the 
  8type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii)….”  These functions are: direct payments or 
transfers, forgoing revenue otherwise due, and provision of goods and services other than 
general infrastructure and purchase of goods.   
In the case of provision of goods and services, a benefit is deemed to be conferred 
only if these are provided at below-market prices.  Merely enabling a private entity to 
provide goods or services at below market prices would seem to fall short of “entrusting” 
or “directing” such an entity to do so.   In the US-Export Restraint case, Canada 
challenged provisions of US countervailing duty law and regulation that included export 
restraints as among the kinds of countervailable subsidies.  The context of this complaint 
was the long-standing dispute between Canada and the US over softwood lumber; US 
producers wanted export restraints on Canadian logs to be treated as subsidies to 
Canadian lumber producers, on the grounds that the effect of these restraints was to 
increase supply and reduce price of such logs in the Canadian market, thereby reducing 
the input costs of Canadian lumber producers.  Unlike in EC-Sugar, in this case the 
government was altering the conditions of the market such as effectively to compel, and 
not merely to enable, sales at lower prices.   Nevertheless, the panel held:   
“Government entrustment or direction is very different from the situation in 
which the government intervenes in the market in some way, which may or may 
not have a particular result simply based on the given factual circumstances and 
the exercise of free choice by the actors in that market. Indeed, governments 
intervene in markets in various ways, and with various policy or profit objectives, 
and these interventions might have various results, including results that are not 
intended by, or that are even undesirable for, the government.”(para. 8.31)   
 
According to the panel, there must be an explicit act of delegation or command to 
the private body to engage in the conduct in question, for a situation of entrustment or 
direction to exist.  In our view, this interpretation of “financial contribution” provides 
very limited opportunities for making “cross-subsidization” arguments under the SCM 
Agreement.    
At the same time, cross-subsidization must not be confused with the issue of 
“pass-through” subsidies, the question of whether by providing an actual financial 
contribution in respect of one product, a government confers a benefit and creates a 
subsidy on another.  Thus, again in the softwood lumber dispute, most of the measures 
besides the export restraints that were the basis for US agency findings of subsidization, 
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for the harvesting of timber at arguably below market rates).   The claim was that by 
subsidizing the production of logs, the government was reducing the price of the crucial 
input in the production of lumber and thereby conferring a “benefit” or competitive 
advantage on Canadian lumber producers.  The approach of the Appellate Body to 
situations where a financial contribution is conferred on one industry but the benefit and 
thus the subsidy is with respect to another is as follows:  
 “The phrase "subsid[ies] bestowed ... indirectly", as used in Article VI:3, implies 
that financial contributions by the government to the production of inputs used in 
manufacturing products subject to an investigation are not, in principle, excluded 
from the amount of subsidies that may be through the imposition of 
countervailing duties on the processed product. Where the producer of the input is 
not the same entity as the producer of the processed product, it cannot be 
presumed, however, that the subsidy bestowed on the input passes through to the 
processed product. In such case, it is necessary to analyze to what extent subsidies 
on inputs may be included in the determination of the total amount of subsidies 
bestowed upon processed products. For it is only the subsidies determined to have 
been granted upon the processed products that may be offset by levying 
countervailing duties on those products. In our view, it would not be possible to 
determine whether countervailing duties levied on the processed product are in 
excess of the amount of the total subsidy accruing to that product, without 
establishing whether, and in what amount, subsidies bestowed on the producer of 
the input flowed through, downstream, to the producer of the product processed 
from that input. Because Article VI:3 permits offsetting, through countervailing 
duties, no more than the "subsidy determined to have been granted ... "directly or 
indirectly, on the manufacture [or] production ... of such product", it follows that 
Members must not impose duties to offset an amount of the input subsidy that has 
not passed through to the countervailed processed products. It is only the amount 
by which an indirect subsidy granted to producers of inputs flows through to the 
processed product, together with the amount of subsidy bestowed directly on 
producers of the processed product, that may be offset through the imposition of 
countervailing duties.”(paras. 140-141) 
 
3. Consistency of the Measures Complained of with the EC’s Schedule 
under the Agreement on Agriculture 
 
Interpretation of Footnote 1 of the EC’s Schedule  
The EC argued that, even if the measures complained of constituted export subsidies 
within the meaning of the Agreement on Agriculture, the payments in question fell within 
the ceilings to which the EC had bound itself in its schedule pursuant to the AoA.  The 
  10AoA requires WTO Members to make commitments to reduce export subsidies on 
agricultural products (Article 9.1).  Article 3.3 provides that if an export subsidy is not 
listed in the Member’s schedule it may not be granted.  Article 9.2(b)(iv) of 
the Agreement on Agriculture stipulates that a Member's budgetary outlays for export 
subsidies and the quantities benefiting from such subsidies, at the conclusion of the 
implementation period shall be no greater than 64 percent and 79 percent of the 1986-
1990 base period levels, respectively.  For developing country Members these 
percentages shall be 76 and 86 percent, respectively.  Thus if a WTO Member wishes to 
continue to grant an export subsidy, (1) it must be scheduled; (2) it must be subject to 
reduction commitments; and (3) these commitments must be such that the percentage 
reductions in budgetary outlays and quantities specified in 9.2(b)(iv) of the AoA are 
achieved by the end of the implementation period. 
The EC did in fact schedule reduction commitments with respect to subsidized 
exports on sugar.  These are contained in Section II, Part IV of the EC Schedule and are 
summarized by the Appellate Body as follows:   
(i) the "base quantity level" (the average of the quantity of subsidized exports of 
sugar during the base period 1986-1990) was 1,612,000 tonnes, and this quantity 
level would be progressively reduced to 1,273,500 tonnes in the year 2000 as the 
"final quantity commitment level" for sugar;  and (ii) the "base outlay level" (the 
average of the budgetary outlay on subsidized exports of sugar during the base 
period 1986-1990) was €779.9 million, and this budgetary outlay level would be 
progressively reduced to €499.1 million in the year 2000 as the "final [budgetary] 
outlay commitment level" for sugar.( Para 159) 
 
The EC did not contest that, if the payments complained were found to constitute 
export subsidies, by virtue of these payments the EC would have failed to meet the 
reduction commitments to which it was bound in the above-noted provisions of its 
Schedule.  However, the EC claimed that, by virtue of Footnote 1 to its Schedule, the 
total ceiling it had bound itself to achieve, in quantity terms, was not 1,273,500 tonnes 
but this amount plus a maximum of an additional 1.6 million tonnes. The EC essentially 
argued that the purpose of footnote 1 was to allow it to meet its commitments in the body 
of its schedule while continuing to subsidize exports of sugar of ACP and Indian origin 
up to 1.6 million tons.   
  11Footnote 1 reads as follows: “Does not include exports of sugar of ACP and 
Indian origin on which the Community is not making any reduction commitments.  The 
average of export in the period 1986 to 1990 amounted to 1,6 mio t.”  The EC version of 
the meaning of this footnote depended on a certain interpretation of both the first and the 
second sentence.  The AB considered each of these interpretations in turn.  In the case of 
the first sentence, the EC claimed that its intent was not to exclude “exports of sugar of 
ACP and Indian origin” as such from reduction commitments, but only the quantities of 
exports equivalent to such exports from its scheduled ceiling for reduction commitments, 
thereby in effect raising the total ceiling by that amount.  The EC advanced this 
interpretation, one assumes, because it was aware that under the AoA there was no basis 
for excluding a specific subset of export subsidies from reduction commitments.   
The basis the EC gave for its non-literal reading of the first sentence was the 
negotiating history of the Uruguay Round.  As summarized by the AB, the EC’s claim 
was that “it was well known to all parties at the time of conclusion of the WTO 
Agreement that the EC did not grant export refunds only on the re-export of sugar 
originally of ACP/Indian origin, but granted export refunds for a quantity equivalent to 
such exports.”(Paragraph  176)  The EC referred to two documents from the travaux to 
support its assertion.  The first was a March 1992 letter to the negotiating parties where 
the EC stated that it "ha[d] not included the volume of sugar corresponding to its imports 
of sugar from ACP countries"(emphasis added).  The second was an Australian 
memorandum dated 31 January 1994 that described Footnote 1 as covering "direct export 
restitutions (corresponding to [the European Communities'] imports of sugar from ACP 
countries and India)". 
The AB rejected the EC’s interpretation, stating:   
Like the Panel, we are not persuaded by these arguments, which rely on the 
presumed knowledge of other Members of the World Trade Organization (the 
"WTO") on the export subsidy practices of the European Communities with 
respect to ACP/India sugar.  We note that the Complaining Parties have rebutted 
the interpretations put forward by the European Communities on the terms, 
context, and negotiating history of Footnote 1.  We also wish to note that the 
European Communities was unable to clarify at the oral hearing, why, having 
written the aforementioned letter in March 1992, it did not consider it necessary to 
use that same language in Footnote 1 in the December 1993 text, or to use 
language that plainly shows that the exports referred to were those equivalent in 
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event, we are of the view that the European Communities' submissions do not 
alter the plain meaning of the first sentence of Footnote 1, so as to make it cover 
the exports of sugar equivalent in volume to the European Communities' imports 
of sugar from ACP countries and India. (para. 180). 
 
With respect to the second sentence of the footnote, the EC claimed that the 
statement “The average of export in the period 1986 to 1990 amounted to 1,6 mio t” 
amounted to a legal undertaking that the total amount of sugar exempted from the 
reduction commitments in the body of the EC’s schedule would not exceed 1.6 million 
tonnes.  In effect, the EC was saying that this was a cap or limitation that satisfied the 
requirement of the AoA that all export subsidies be included in overall reduction 
commitments in Members’ schedules.  
The AB rejected this interpretation, stating: 
The fact that the second sentence makes a specific reference to the average of 
such exports in the base period does not necessarily lead to an inference that there 
is a commitment in the sentence to "limit" the quantity of subsidization to that 
level, particularly when the first sentence says that the European Communities is 
not making "any reduction commitments".  Nor does the practice of the European 
Communities providing subsidies on exports equivalent to its actual imports from 
ACP countries and India lead to an inference that that practice flows from a 
commitment contained in the second sentence of Footnote 1. 
 
Lastly, we see merit in the Panel's reference to the notification practice of the 
European Communities to the WTO Committee on Agriculture to conclude that 
this practice does not support the interpretation advanced by the European 
Communities.  If Footnote 1 does contain a commitment on the part of the 
European Communities with respect to the export subsidies provided by it on 
exports of sugar equivalent in volume to its actual imports from ACP countries 
and India or 1.6 million tonnes (albeit such a commitment is only a "limitation" 
commitment and not a "reduction" commitment), we fail to see why the European 
Communities did not notify the WTO Committee on Agriculture of the status of 
its compliance with that commitment throughout the period of implementation of 
the  Agreement on Agriculture.  The fact that the European Communities did not 




In our view, the AB’s rejection of the EC’s “Everybody knows” reading of footnote 1 is a 
correct approach to treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
  13Treaties (VCLT) and is also desirable from the perspective of fundamental systemic 
concerns in the WTO legal system, namely internal and external and internal 
transparency.  The VCLT Article 32 permits recourse to the negotiating history only ‘in 
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine 
the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning 
ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable.”  There is nothing “ambiguous or obscure” in the language “does not 
include exports of ACP/India Sugar on which the community is not making any reduction 
commitments.”  The words plainly say that the EC is not making any reduction 
commitments on these particular exports.   The question of whether the plain meaning 
leads to a result that is “absurd or unreasonable” is somewhat more difficult.  It is 
arguable that the plain meaning is “absurd or unreasonable” as it would lead to the result 
that the EC would have made a scheduling that violates the unqualified obligation in AoA 
9.1 to schedule reduction commitments on export subsidies and in AoA 3.3 not to grant 
any subsidy that has not been scheduled.  The fact is, however, that even if one reads the 
second sentence as containing a legally binding commitment to limit the quantity 
subsidized to 1.6 million tonnes, the non-literal meaning urged by the EC would not save 
it from the result of non-compliance with the AoA, since a limitation to this amount could 
not be construed, and indeed the EC was not urging it to be construed, as a commitment 
to reduction of the amount by the percentage and in the time frame required by the AoA.   
In sum, if what is “absurd or unreasonable” in the result of the literal interpretation of the 
first sentence of the footnote is that it would entail the EC having made a scheduling 
contrary to the AoA this result could not be avoided through recourse to the negotiating 
history in the manner suggested by the EC.   Thus, under Article 32 of the VCLT, there 
was no basis for the EC to demand that the AB rely on the negotiating history.    
As for the AB’s rejection of the view that the second sentence of the footnote 
contains a binding legal commitment to limit-albeit not reduce-subsidization to 1.6 
million tonnes, the AB’s view that a mere statement of the practice of a state party cannot 
without some further wording be understood as a binding in international law is broadly 
consistent with general international law doctrine.  To establish an obligation of 
customary international law, not only is evidence of state practice  required but proof of 
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Perhaps even more relevant is the law as it relates to binding unilateral declarations of 
states.  As the adopted panel in the s. 301 case noted, a statement by a state should not be 
taken to give rise to a legal obligation unless strict conditions are met, including a 
manifest intent to be bound by the statement.(US-S. 301 of the Tariff Act, paragraph 7.118 
and accompanying footnote).  In this respect we note that the AB adverted to a significant 
piece of evidence that the EC had not intended to be bound, namely that the EC had not 
notified to the WTO Agriculture Committee its compliance with this purported 
commitment, as it was required to do under the AoA. 
  More generally, the EC’s contention that its Schedule should be interpreted based 
on insider knowledge of the trade negotiator community about the history of its export 
subsidization practices is at odds with policies of internal and external transparency that 
are important to the legitimacy of the WTO.   Such knowledge is obviously available 
only to a limited group of persons and is not documented in any public transparent 
venue.
10  At most, those negotiating parties most intimately engaged in negotiations with 
the EC over export subsidies would have become aware of the practices in question (even 
assuming that they could infer from awareness of the practices the particular 
interpretation of the legal commitments in question urged by the EC).  Scheduled 
commitments indicate the terms and conditions on which economic actors may compete 
in the global marketplace with the scheduling Member; it is important to advancing the 
goals of the trading system that such terms and conditions be accessible to economic 
actors and to all interested constituencies, for that matter, and that they be secure and 
legally predictable (see US-S .301 of the Tariff Act on the importance of security and 
predictability to advancing the goals of the WTO system). 
 
                                                 
10 In US-Shrimp, the Appellate Body held that the “sprit” of transparency, as reflected in the obligations in 
Article X of the GATT, should inform interpretation of other WTO provisions, especially where a WTO 
Member is claiming “exception.” (paragraphs 182-183).  While the “letter” of Article X applies to domestic 
regulations and their administration,  and the schedule is an international legal instrument, the schedule 
provides the basis on which economic actors from other WTO Members can form expectations concerning 
the terms and conditions of competition with the scheduling Member; therefore the “spirit” of Article X is 
definitely engaged where a Member schedules so as to express in a non-transparent manner a limitation or 
exception to what would normally be expected to be its liberalization obligations.  
  15Consistency of the EC Reduction Commitments with its Obligations under the 
Agreement on Agriculture 
 
Having determined that the ordinary meaning of Footnote 1 to the EC schedule was that 
the EC was purporting to exempt export subsidies on ACP/India sugar from reduction 
commitments altogether, it is hardly surprising that the AB would then go on to 
determine that this exemption was inconsistent with the AoA. 
First of all, the AB held that reduction commitments must be scheduled both in 
terms of   budgetary outlays for export subsidies and the quantities benefiting from such 
subsidies; thus, even if the AB had been able to agree with the meaning of Footnote 1 
advanced by the EC Footnote 1 would have still run afoul of the AoA through failing to 
mention any limitation or reduction of budgetary outlays but rather referring exclusively 
to quantities. 
The EC had argued that there was no specific provision of the AoA that requires 
scheduling both in terms of budgetary outlays and quantities subsidized.  However, the 
AB relied on the nature of the underlying obligation to make reduction commitments as 
set forth in AoA 3.3, which reads as follows: 
“Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2(b) and 4 of Article 9, a Member shall 
not provide export subsidies listed in paragraph 1 of Article 9 in respect of the 
agricultural products or groups of products specified in Section II of Part IV of its 
Schedule in excess of the budgetary outlay and quantity commitment levels 
specified therein and shall not provide such subsidies in respect of any 
agricultural product not specified in that Section of its Schedule.” 
 
Concerning the implications of this obligation, the AB suggested: 
In our view, the use of the conjunctive "and", and the corresponding use of the 
word "levels" in the plural, suggest that the drafters of the Agreement intended 
that both types of commitments must be specified in a Member's Schedule in 
respect of any export subsidy listed in Article 9.1.  Had the drafters intended that 
a Member could specify one or the other of the two forms of commitments, they 
would have chosen the disjunctive "or" and correspondingly used the word "level" 
in the singular.  Given the choice, Members would choose only one or the other 
type of commitment, but not both, so as to minimize their obligations.  Therefore, 
it appears to us that the drafters intended to ensure that export subsidy 
commitments are specified in Members' Schedules in terms of both budgetary 
outlay and quantity commitments, by using the word "and" as well as the word 
"levels" in the text of Article 3.3. (para. 193) 
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We find contextual support for the above interpretation in Article 9.2(b)(iv) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture, which provides that Member's budgetary outlays for 
export subsidies and the quantities benefiting from such subsidies, at the 
conclusion of the implementation period, are no greater than 64 per cent and 
79 per cent of the 1986-1990 base period levels, respectively.  For developing 
country Members these percentages shall be 76 and 86 per cent, respectively. This 
provision prescribes the export subsidy commitment levels to be reached at the 
conclusion of the implementation period (and to be maintained thereafter), and 
those commitment levels are expressed in terms of both budgetary outlays and 
quantities.  We do not see how a Member could comply with Article 9.2(b)(iv), or 
for that matter Article 9.2(a), without having specified its export subsidy 
commitments in terms of both budgetary outlays and quantities.  We also consider 
it significant that both Article 9.2(b)(iii) and Article 9.2(b)(iv) use the expression 
"budgetary outlays for export subsidies and the quantities benefiting from such 
subsidies". (emphasis added)  This shows the drafters' recognition of the need to 
address the budgetary outlays and quantities together. (para. 194). 
 
More fundamentally, however, the AB went on to affirm the obvious respect in 
which footnote 1 was inconsistent with the substantive obligations of the Agreement on 
Agriculture:  9.1 AoA simply does not provide any “carve out” or safe haven for 
particular subsidies in respect of the obligation to make reduction commitments. The AB 
noted: 
The chapeau of Article 9.1 says that the subsidies listed in that Article "are subject 
to reduction commitments under this Agreement".  The export subsidies given to 
ACP/India equivalent sugar, which admittedly fall within the ambit of Article 
9.1(a), are therefore subject to reduction commitments.  Furthermore, as noted by 
the Panel, the provisions of Article 9.2(b)(iv) apply to Members that take 
advantage of the flexibility provisions of Article 9.2(b).  Article 9.2(b)(iv) 
specifies the reduction levels to be achieved at the conclusion of the 
implementation period with respect to both budgetary outlays and quantities.  The 
provisions of Article 9.2(b)(iv) lend contextual support to the view that export 
subsidies listed in Article 9.1 are subject to reduction commitments.  We further 
note that Article 9.2(a)(i) and (ii) also make it clear that both budgetary outlay and 
quantity commitments specified in a Member's Schedule for each year of the 
implementation period are "reduction" commitments.  It follows that the export 
subsidies provided to ACP/India equivalent sugar are subject to reduction 
commitments in terms of Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture. (para. 206)  
 
Finally, the AB addressed an argument of the ACP countries, Third Parties in the 
litigation, that in certain circumstances the AoA permits limitations of export subsidies in 
  17lieu of reduction commitments (this argument of course assumes the validity of the EC 
reading of Footnote 1, namely that this footnote articulates a legally binding limitation on 
export subsidies, if not a literal reduction commitment; since the AB had already rejected 
such a reading of Footnote 1, its remarks on the ACP argument are, strictly speaking, 
obiter dicta).  The AB opined: 
The ACP Countries
11 have argued that "limiting subsidization", without reducing 
budgetary outlays or quantity, is permissible under Article 3.1 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture, which says that "[t]he domestic support and export subsidy 
commitments in Part IV of each Member's Schedule constitute commitments 
 limiting subsidization" (emphasis added). According to the ACP Countries, "the 
basic obligations of the Agreement with respect to a scheduled product such as 
sugar are found in Articles 3.3 and 8.  These paramount provisions are framed 
around and are directly linked to what is specified by the respective member 
limiting subsidization in the sense of requirements in Article 3.1 of the 
Agreement."  In response to questioning at the oral hearing, the ACP Countries 
also emphasized that Article 3.1 permits "limiting" subsidization, and only what is 
specified in a Member's Schedule governs its obligation with respect to 
subsidization. 
 
We are not persuaded by this argument.  We do not see Article 3.1 as permitting a 
Member to limit subsidization to whatever commitment it chooses to specify in its 
Schedule without regard to Members' obligations under the Agreement on 
Agriculture.  Rather, with respect to export subsidy commitments, we see Article 
3.1 as requiring a Member to limit its subsidization to the budgetary outlay and 
quantity reduction commitments specified in its Schedule in accordance with the 
provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture. This is also clear from the provisions 
of Article 9.2(a) of the Agreement, which requires adherence by a Member in 
each year of the implementation period to the budgetary outlay and quantity 




The AoA clearly requires WTO Members to achieve the result of reduction commitments 
both in terms of budgetary outlay and quantity of exports subsidies:  inferring from this 
obviously intended result the requirement that schedules be structured in those terms is 
however not a self-evident interpretive move.  One reading of the Chile-Price Band and 
Argentina-Footwear AB Reports is that, absent an explicit textual requirement, a 
                                                 
11The third participant ACP countries in this appeal are:  Barbados, Belize, Côte d'Ivoire, Fiji, Guyana, 
Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, St. Kitts & Nevis, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Trinidad & 
Tobago. 
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provided that it achieves the result of operating within the ceilings that it is legally bound 
to conform to.  In these cases, the defending WTO Members had used formulas or 
methodologies for determining tariffs in customs administration that deviated from the ad 
valorem or specific methods used for scheduling; the approach of the AB in these cases 
was to determine whether, regardless of the formula or methodology used, the result was 
the possibility of protection being imposed in excess of the underlying legal obligation 
not to exceed the scheduled ad valorem MFN bound tariff rate.  From this perspective 
arguably it would not be necessary to require that both budgetary outlay and quantity be 
scheduled, as long as within the specified time period EC policies were adjusted so as to 
ensure the required reductions in both actually occurred.    
Did therefore the AB take an unjustified interpretative leap in reading in a 
requirement that schedules specify both budgetary outlay and quantity?  We think not.  In 
Chile-Price Band and Argentina-Footwear, there was an objective benchmark already in 
the defending Member’s schedule against which it was possible to assess whether the 
obligation of result had been met, namely a tariff ceiling expressed in ad valorem terms.  
In the case of export subsidies under the AoA determining whether the underlying 
obligation of result has been met, i.e. a certain percentage reduction in both budgetary 
outlay and quantity, is impossible unless the Member in question specifies at a minimum 
the base outlays and quantities against which the percentage reductions can be measured 
over the specified time period. The fact is that transparency and specificity in scheduling 
and reporting are essential to legal security in a regime such as this, where Members are 
required to improve market access through the adjustment of labyrinthine and often 
opaque (in design and/or administration) domestic policy schemes.   
In any event, we see the other interpretations of the AoA made by the AB in this 
part of its report as straightforward and logical, and not meriting specific commentary.   
Certainly, we agree with the AB that the use of the word “limiting” does not necessarily 
imply that in the absence of operative language, the AoA entertains the possibility of 
Members discharging their obligations under 9.1 through limits other than, or not 
including, the manifestly required reduction commitments. 
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scheduling? 
 
The EC argued that, even if Footnote 1 was inconsistent with the AoA, by the acceptance 
of its schedule in the Uruguay Round negotiations, the EC had effectively altered its 
obligations under the AoA, or that the schedule somehow had an equal legal status to the 
AoA itself such that the obligations of the EC under the AoA should be read such that 
they were consistent with the rights reserved under the schedule. The AB rejected this 
argument. It observed: 
Article 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture, entitled "Export Competition 
Commitments", reads:  Each Member undertakes not to provide export subsidies 
otherwise than in conformity with this Agreement and with the commitments as 
specified in that Member's Schedule. It is clear from the plain wording of Article 
8 that Members are prohibited from providing export subsidies otherwise than in 
conformity with the Agreement on Agriculture and the commitments as specified 
in their Schedules.  Thus, compliance with both is obligatory.  As compliance 
with the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture is obligatory, it is clear that 
the commitments specified in a Member's Schedule must be in conformity with 
the provisions of the Agreement.  Only then would the export subsidies be in 
compliance with the requirements of Article 8. (paragraphs 215-216) 
 
The EC had argued that the notion that scheduling cannot be used to limit or 
qualify obligations under a WTO treaty was derived in an unwarranted manner from the 
ruling in an old GATT case, coincidentally also concerning sugar.  Thus, according to the 
EC the panel in that case had depended on specific language in the GATT that addressed 
the possibility of qualifying obligations that were specific to the GATT regime, and the 
reasoning in question could not be transferred mutatis mutandis to the interpretation of 
the AoA. 
The AB disagreed with the EC, finding that the panel had articulated a more 
general jurisprudential notion:  
The GATT panel in US – Sugar did not rely solely on the language of 
Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1947 in making its ruling, as the European 
Communities suggests.  Instead, the panel's reasoning was that, in the absence of 
a specific provision that would entitle Members to depart from their obligations 
under the GATT 1947, Members were not entitled to do so.  Thus, the GATT 
panel in US – Sugar concluded:  Article II:1(b) does not permit contracting parties 
to qualify their obligations under other provisions of the General Agreement and 
that the provisions in the United States GATT Schedule of Concessions can 
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inconsistent with the application of Article XI:1.  Similarly, in this case, we find 
no provision under the Agreement on Agriculture that authorizes Members to 
depart, in their Schedules, from their obligations under that Agreement.  Indeed, 
as we have noted, Article 8 requires that, in providing export subsidies, Members 
must comply with the provisions of both the Agreement on Agriculture and the 
export subsidy commitments specified in their Schedules.  This is possible only if 
the commitments in the Schedules are in conformity with the provisions of 
the Agreement on Agriculture.  Thus, we see no basis for the European 
Communities' assertion that it could depart from the obligations under the 
Agreement on Agriculture through the claimed commitment provided in Footnote 
1.  (paras 219-220). 
 
Finally, the AB rejected the EC argument that its schedule was equal in hierarchy of legal 
norms with the AoA itself and thus that the obligations of the AoA should be interpreted 
in a manner consistent with the schedule.  The AB noted: 
…that Article 21 of the Agreement on Agriculture provides that:  "[t]he provisions 
of [the] GATT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to 
the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement."  In 
other words, Members explicitly recognized that there may be conflicts between 
the Agreement on Agriculture and the GATT 1994, and explicitly provided, 
through Article 21, that the Agreement on Agriculture would prevail to the extent 
of such conflicts.  Similarly, the General interpretative note to Annex 1A to the 
WTO Agreement states that, "[i]n the event of conflict between a provision of the 
[GATT 1994] and a provision of another agreement in Annex 1A ..., the provision 
of the other agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict."  The Agreement 
on Agriculture is contained in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement. 
 
The AB then observed: 
As a separate matter, we note that the European Communities asserts that 
Footnote 1 was "negotiated" with its partners in the Uruguay Round negotiations 
and that it has been "respected". Accordingly, Footnote 1 forms part of the treaty 
ratified by the WTO Members. Similarly, the ACP Countries allege that Footnote 
1 "was negotiated and agreed upon" or acquiesced in by the Complaining Parties 
before the end of the Uruguay Round.  The Panel found, however, that "[t]he 
evidence and submissions produced by all parties show that the Complainants did 
not agree to any European Communities' deviations from the Agreement on 
Agriculture."  The Panel concluded that "participants in the Uruguay Round and 
WTO Members did not agree to the European Communities' inclusion of Footnote 
1 as an agreed departure from the European Communities' basic obligations under 
the Agreement on Agriculture."  Accordingly, we see no basis in the Panel 
Reports for the contention of the European Communities and the ACP Countries 
that the Complaining Parties or the WTO Members negotiated or agreed to 
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Agreement on Agriculture 
 
Commentary 
According to Article 19 of the VCLT,  “a State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, 
approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless: (a) the reservation is 
prohibited by the treaty; (b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do 
not include the reservation in question, may be made; or (c) in cases not falling under 
sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of 
the treaty.”  The findings of the US-Sugar panel did not apparently take into account this 
provision of the VCLT and indeed seem to be inconsistent with it, in as much as the panel 
declared an opposite default rule, namely that no reservations are permitted from a treaty 
unless the text explicitly allows them.  Nevertheless, the default rule of the US-Sugar 
panel has now been incorporated into the WTO system as a default rule, by virtue of the 
WTO Agreement Article XVI:5, which provides that “Reservations in respect of any of 
the provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements may only be made to the extent 
provided for in those Agreements.” By virtue of VCLT 19(b) this lex specialis must 
prevail.   
Moreover, the WTO Agreement elaborates a very specific detailed procedure that 
must be followed where a WTO obligation is to be waived for a particular WTO Member 
(Article IX:3-5).  Even if it existed as the EC claimed, acquiescence or casual agreement 
among negotiators to Footnote 1 as a departure from the obligations of the AoA could 
hardly substitute for the waiver procedure outlined in Article IX of the WTO Agreement, 
and which is in any event only available in “exceptional circumstances.”  Finally, there is 
an issue as to whether Article 41 of the VCLT, which deals with modifications of treaties 
that change obligations only between certain parties, would apply to a situation where all 
of the parties to a multilateral treaty modify the obligations of a single party towards all 
of them (the situation of waiver).  However, in any case, Article 41 on its terms defers to 
any limitations or procedures in the treaty itself concerning such modifications, and this 
brings us back to the lex specialis of waivers in Article IX of the WTO Agreement. 
The above analysis clearly supports the result of the AB ruling.  We find it odd, 
however, in terms of the hierarchy of sources of law in the WTO system that the AB 
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the foundational charter of the WTO legal system. 
 
Estoppel and Good Faith 
The EC claimed that the Complaining Parties acted inconsistently with Article 3.10 of the 
DSU and the principle of good faith by exercising their rights under the DSU in an 
"unreasonable" and "abusive manner" by "seeking to exploit what would be, at most, an 
excusable scheduling error in order to secure a manifestly unfair advantage" and further 
that they were estopped from bringing DSU proceedings because they, along with all the 
other participants in the Uruguay Round negotiations, had given the EC to understand 
that they did not consider C sugar to benefit from export subsidies; here, the EC pointed 
to the non-reaction of Uruguay Round participants when the EC failed to include C sugar 
in its base levels.  The panel found that this mere non-reaction was insufficient to 
establish the kind of representation upon which an estoppel might be based
12 and that 
there was no direct evidence of an actual shared understanding by Uruguay Round 
participants concerning C sugar.   But the panel also expressed serious doubts as to 
whether the principle of estoppel was applicable to WTO disputes.   
  In addressing the issue of estoppel, the Appellate Body echoed the uncertainty of 
the panel as to the applicability of the principle of estoppel to WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings.  The AB opined:    
“The principle of estoppel has never been applied by the Appellate Body. 
Moreover, the notion of estoppel, as advanced by the European Communities, 
would appear to inhibit the ability of WTO Members to initiate a WTO dispute 
settlement proceeding. We see little in the DSU that explicitly limits the rights of 
WTO Members to bring an action; WTO Members must exercise their 
                                                 
12 Estoppel refers to the notion that some kinds of representations and conduct are such that the party 
responsible for them may be precluded from repudiating them, meaning often that the party in question 
may have legal responsibility for the reliance of other parties on the representations and conduct.  Brownlie 
(2003), following Bowett, has suggested three conditions that must be fulfilled to establish an estoppel:  
“(1) a statement of fact that is clear and unambiguous; 2) this statement must be voluntary, unconditional, 
and authorized; and (3) there must be reliance in good faith upon the statement either to the detriment of the 
party so relying on the statement or to the advantage of the party making the statement.” In the Argentina-
Poultry case, Argentina unsuccessfully invoked this definition of estoppel to argue that by commencing 
proceedings in MERCOSUR in relation to the same dispute (on antidumping duties), Brazil was estopped 
from bringing a further action in the WTO; while finding that the conditions stated by Brownlie had not 
been met in that case, the panel seemed open to the view that this definition could be an adequate statement 
of the definition of estoppel as a general principle of law.  
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virtue of Article 3.7 of the DSU, and they must engage in dispute settlement 
procedures in good faith, by virtue of Article 3.10 of the DSU. This latter 
obligation covers, in our view, the entire spectrum of dispute settlement, from the 
point of initiation of a case through implementation. Thus, even assuming 
arguendo that the principle of estoppel could apply in the WTO, its application 
would fall within these narrow parameters set out in the DSU.”(para. 311) 
  
The AB went on, however, to make no finding of law concerning the applicability 
of estoppel in WTO proceedings; it held that even assuming applicability along the lines 
that the EC was arguing, the panel had determined that the EC had not proven the facts 
necessary to establish an estoppel. 
 
Commentary 
The AB’s approach here is incoherent.  It is impossible to establish what facts would be 
needed to prove an estoppel without examining the nature and scope of the principle 
itself, as circumscribed or limited (if at all) by the WTO treaty texts.  For example, if 
acquiescence or silence can be a basis for estoppel, it is far from clear that the findings of 
the panel concerning the lack of proof of explicit statements or representations or the lack 
of proof of a “shared understanding” would be enough to reject a claim of estoppel.    
The legal authorities are divided as to whether estoppel includes acquiescence 
upon which a state may reasonably rely or whether estoppel and acquiescence are 
separate equitable grounds for refusing a legal claim.
13 In the Guatemala-Cement case, 
the panel contrasted estoppel with a situation of “acquiescence,” which meant “silence in 
the face of events that call for a reaction of some sort.”(Para. 8.23)  In the Temple of 
Preah Vihear case, the International Court of Justice found that Thailand, in not objecting 
to a map filed as an annex to an agreement with Cambodia, could not claim that it had 
sovereignty over a temple that was drawn on the map as within Cambodian territory. The 
ICJ also noted that in the 50 years or more since the map was filed, Thailand’s 
subsequent conduct was consistent with the view that the temple was within Cambodian 
jurisdiction.
14 In his separate opinion in the case, Judge Fitzmaurice appeared to take the 
                                                 
13 See Sinclair (1995, p. 110). 
14 Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962: I.C.J. Reports 
1962, p. 32. 
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separate legal principle:  “The principle of preclusion is the nearest equivalent in the field 
of international law to the common-law rule of estoppel, though perhaps not applied 
under such strict limiting conditions (and it is certainly applied as a rule of substance and 
not merely as one of evidence or procedure). It is quite distinct theoretically from the 
notion of acquiescence. But acquiescence can operate as a preclusion or estoppel in 
certain cases, for instance where silence, on an occasion where there was a duty or need 
to speak or act, implies agreement, or a waiver of rights, and can be regarded as a 
representation to that effect ...”  Victor Rodríguez Cedeño, Special Rapporteur to the 
International Law Commission, noted in 2005 that in the Preah Vihear case,” in the 
reasoning of the Court the elements of estoppel and acquiescence are combined.”
15
  The correct way for the AB to proceed in considering the EC’s estoppel claim was 
to begin by considering first the nature and scope of estoppel as a general principle of 
international law and, secondly, whether the provisions of the WTO treaties have altered 
or narrowed its applicability in the WTO. Only then could the AB properly conclude that 
the facts, as determined by the panel, did not support a valid claim of estoppel. 
  In the passage cited above, without first considering the nature and scope of 
estoppel as a general principle, the AB nevertheless suggests, in dicta, that its application 
is somehow narrowed by the terms of the DSU.   The notion seems to be that DSU 3.7 
and 3.10 somehow replace and circumscribe the broader concept of equity in general 
international law.   
It is true that 3.10 expresses one element of equity, namely “good faith.”  It is 
unclear why this should lead to the conclusion that 3.10 thereby narrows or limits the 
application of other principles of international law based on equity, such as estoppel.   In 
the Shrimp/Turtle case, the AB had held that “The chapeau of Article XX is, in fact, but 
one expression of the principle of good faith. This principle, at once a general principle of 
law and a general principle of international law, controls the exercise of rights by 
states.”(para. 158)  Notably, the AB did not conclude that by expressing one aspect of the 
principle of good faith in the chapeau, the WTO Membership had limited or replaced 
good faith as a general principle of international law with a narrower treaty obligation; 
                                                 
15 International Law Commission (2005, para. 161). 
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chapeau, seeking additional interpretative guidance, as appropriate, from the general 
principles of international law.”(para. 158; emphasis added).  Even earlier, in the EC-
Meat Hormones Report, paragraph 124, the AB had found, although reflected in a 
specific provision in the SPS Agreement (5.7, which allows preliminary measures in the 
absence of sufficient scientific evidence), was not exhausted by 5.7; it could thus affect 
the application of other provisions of SPS. 
  It is difficult to reconcile the approach taken to estoppel in EC-Sugar with that 
taken to good faith in US-Shrimp.   Perhaps it is significant that the EC was invoking 
estoppel as a bar to legal proceedings in EC-Sugar.  We do agree with the AB to the 
extent that it is saying that the invocation of general principles of international law as a 
bar to adjudicative jurisdiction can be problematic in a legal system such as the WTO 
where the bases for jurisdiction of the dispute settlement organs are set out explicitly by 
treaty, and provide virtually no discretion to panels to decline to adjudicate a dispute on 
broad equitable considerations.  However, the AB never clearly distinguishes the issue of 
the general applicability of the principle of estoppel in the WTO with the issue of 
whether estoppel can function as a jurisdictional bar (which is what the the EC appeared 
to be arguing).  Indeed, quite apart from the WTO context, it is far from clear that 
estoppel as a general principle of international law can or should be understood as a bar 
to jurisdiction rather than to the advancement of a specific legal claim. 
.  As for the AB’s treatment of the EC claim concerning “good faith” it rather 
summarily upheld the panel’s rejection of that claim. This is not surprising, for the same 
considerations that were rejected as a foundation for the estoppel claim were the basis, it 
seems, for the (partly separate or additional claim) of a violation of “good faith.”  
 
4. Judicial Economy 
In WTO dispute settlement a situation often arises where a complainant makes claims 
under a variety of provisions in a covered agreement or under several covered 
agreements.  Often, if the adjudicator finds a violation of one or more provisions of an 
agreement, they will not go on to consider the other claims, including those under a 
different covered agreement.  This practice is known as judicial economy.  The rationale 
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agreement is adequate to “resolve” the dispute, in that it is sufficient to give rise to the 
remedy that the complainant is seeking, usually withdrawal of the measures complained 
of, or their modification in such a way as to permit the market access or the competitive 
conditions that are the complainant’s underlying objectives. The panel in EC-Sugar, 
having found that the EC payments complained of were in violation of the AoA, did not 
go on to consider the complainants’ claims that provisions of the SCM Agreement had 
also been violated.  This use of judicial economy raised a serious legal issue on appeal, 
however, because the SCM Agreement contains a remedy for illegal export subsidization 
that would not be provided by the DSU in the case of violations of the AoA.  This special 
remedy is provided for in SCM 4.7:  “If the measure in question is found to be a 
prohibited subsidy, the panel shall recommend that the subsidizing Member withdraw the 
subsidy without delay. In this regard, the panel shall specify in its recommendation the 
time-period within which the measure must be withdrawn.” 
In rejecting the panel’s use of judicial economy as a legal error the AB held: 
In this case, the Panel's findings under Articles 3 and 8 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture were not sufficient to "fully resolve" the dispute.  This is because, in 
declining to rule on the Complaining Parties' claims under Article 3 of the SCM 
Agreement, the Panel precluded the possibility of a remedy being made available 
to the Complaining Parties, pursuant to Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, in the 
event of the Panel finding in favour of the Complaining Parties with respect to 
their claims under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement.  Moreover, in declining to 
rule on the Complaining Parties' claims under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, 
the Panel failed to discharge its obligation under Article 11 of the DSU by failing 
to make "such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the 
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered 
agreements", namely, a recommendation or ruling by the DSB pursuant to 
Article 4.7.  This constitutes false judicial economy and legal error. (para. 335) 
 
Having found the panel in error, nevertheless the AB did not go on to complete 
the analysis, i.e. to consider the claims that the panel ought to have considered under the 
AoA.
16 The AB gave the following reasons for refusing to complete the analysis: 
                                                 
16In domestic legal systems, where an appellate tribunal has found errors of law in the judgment of a trial 
court, it may remand the matter to the trial level so that the trial court can apply the law as clarified by the 
appellate tribunal to the facts of the dispute.  Under the DSU, the AB does not possess a comparable 
authority to remand a matter to the original panel.   In these circumstances, the AB has engaged in a 
practice it calls “completing the analysis.”  This means that having found errors of law in the panel ruling, 
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specifically addressed by the panel, in order to complete the legal analysis and 
resolve the dispute between the parties".  However, the Appellate Body has 
declined to complete the legal analysis where "the factual findings of the panel 
and the undisputed facts in the panel record" did not provide a sufficient basis for 
the legal analysis by the Appellate Body.  Moreover, as Article 17.6 of the DSU 
limits appeals to "issues of law covered in the panel report and legal 
interpretations developed by the panel", the Appellate Body has also previously 
declined to complete the legal analysis of a panel in circumstances where that 
would involve addressing claims "which the panel had not examined at all".  In 
addition, the Appellate Body has indicated that it may complete the analysis only 
if the provision that a panel has not examined is "closely related" to a provision 
that the panel has examined, and that the two are "part of a logical continuum". 
 
Turning to the specific case before us, we note that the Complaining Parties argue 
that their claims under the SCM Agreement are closely related to their claims 
under the Agreement on Agriculture.  We are not persuaded, however, that 
Articles 3, 8, and 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture, on the one hand, and 
Articles 3.1(a), 3.2, and items (a) and (d) of the Illustrative List of the SCM 
Agreement, on the other hand, are "closely related", because the issues presented 
under the two Agreements are different in several respects.  
 
Furthermore, in the instant case, we note that the Panel made reference to the 
limited arguments made by the Complaining Parties under the SCM Agreement: 
[T]he Complainants [had] not set forth their claims under Article 3 of the SCM 
Agreement in quite as clear and unambiguous a manner as under the Agreement 
on Agriculture.  Rather, [they] focused on their claims under the Agreement on 
Agriculture.  
 
Although, on appeal, the Complaining Parties did argue their claims under the 
SCM Agreement to some extent, they did not address, in a sufficient manner, the 
question whether Article 3 of the SCM Agreement applies to export subsidies 
listed in Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture that are provided 
to scheduled agricultural products in excess of a responding Member's 
commitment levels.  We believe that, in the light of Article 21 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture and the chapeau of Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, the question 
of the applicability of the SCM Agreement to the export subsidies in this dispute 
raises a number of complex issues.  We also consider that, in the absence of a full 
exploration of these issues, completing the analysis might affect the due process 
rights of the participants.  
 
Moreover, we do not have the requisite factual findings to complete the legal 
analysis.  In particular, we do not have sufficient facts before us, as would be 
                                                                                                                                                 
the AB will not simply leave matters at reversing or modifying the panel’s legal findings, but will proceed 
to apply the law as the AB has clarified it to the existing factual record of the case, as developed in the 
panel proceeding. 
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of the SCM Agreement.  We note in this respect that, when specifying what period 
would represent "without delay", panels have taken into account, inter alia, "the 
nature of the measures and the difficulties likely to be faced in implementing the 
recommendation".  Based on our reading of the Panel Reports and the Panel 
record, we fail to see any evidence therein regarding the nature of the measures 
that would be required to "withdraw" the subsidy, which would permit us to make 
a recommendation under Article 4.7.  Hence, even if we were able to examine the 
Complaining Parties' claims under the SCM Agreement and, even if we were to 
conclude that the SCM Agreement applies in the circumstances of this dispute and 
that the European Communities acted inconsistently with its obligations under 
the SCM Agreement, we would not necessarily be in a position to make a 




The existence of an explicit discrete remedy in the SCM Agreement not provided in the 
AoA made this a relatively easy case for rejecting the use of judicial economy.   
However, the underlying issue of principle, whether adjudicating a given claim is 
necessary to fully or adequately resolve a dispute, given that other claims have already 
been found to issue in violations, is a much trickier one.  There are many instances where 
the violation of a particular provision of a covered agreement will not necessarily trigger 
a remedy that will achieve the complainant’s objectives. Take, for instance, the SPS 
Agreement; a complaining Member may be challenging a measure as a violation of the 
national treatment and MFN provisions of SPS, as not based on an adequate risk 
assessment, as well as not least-trade-restrictive (5.6). If a panel were, for instance, to 
stop at a finding that the defending Member’s risk assessment was inadequate under 5.1 a 
sufficient remedy would be for the defending Member to conduct a competent risk 
assessment (although there is always the possibility that such an assessment would not 
provide a basis for the measures and they would have to be withdrawn, this would not 
necessarily by any means be the case).  However, if the panel went on to make findings 
on the other claims under SPS this might well result in the defending Member being 
required to alter substantive aspects of the measure itself, or withdraw it altogether.   
More generally, different aspects of a measure may raise different barriers to trade, each 
of which is of importance to the complaining Member.  If these different aspects violate 
different legal provisions of the covered agreements, then judicial economy will 
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other of the aspects will only result normally in a requirement that the Member address 
those aspects, not withdraw the measure entirely.   In sum, to honor truly the underlying 
principle deployed by the AB in its ruling on judicial economy, panels will have to be a 
great deal more careful in their decisions concerning judicial economy,   A further 
systemic consideration here is that where there is an action under DSU 21.5 concerning 
the adequacy of the defending Member’s implementation of a panel ruling, the 21.5 panel 
will normally consider the consistency of the implementing measures, not only with those 
provisions of the covered agreements with which the original measures were found to be 
non-compliant in the first panel ruling, but if with any other provisions that the 
complaining Member wishes to claim under in the 21.5 proceeding (provided of course 
they are within the terms of reference as established by the request for a 21.5 
panel.(Canada-Aircraft 21.5 Report of the Appellate Body; US-Shrimp 21.5, Report of 
the Appellate Body).  This extends even to claims never made in the original proceedings 
and must surely include those that were fully argued but over which the original panel 
decided to exercise judicial economy.  From this point of view, judicial economy may not 
be particularly “economic” and only have the odd (and arguably undesirable) result of 
delaying the adjudication of certain claims to the implementation stage of the dispute. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Our analysis suggests that the arguments of the panel regarding cross-subsidization can 
be defended on both legal and economic grounds. Indeed, the economic reasoning 
applied by the panel was conservative in that it covers only a subset of the possible 
situations that can give rise to cross-subsidization in situations where only part of 
production benefits from support policies. Although the reasoning of the panel – that 
support policies that create rents on a portion of a firm’s output may allow for the cross-
subsidization of exports – is quite general, the potential for similar arguments to be 
applied to instances involving non-agricultural products where governments have not 
made explicit export subsidy commitments is likely to be very limited. Arguments that it 
does not matter whether the cross-subsidies are in fact contingent on exports, but that 
what matters is whether de facto a policy generates incentives to cross-subsidize exports, 
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made. Thus, this case does not open up possibilities for countries to argue for imposition 
of countervailing measures on the basis of alleged cross-subsidies, or to policies that 
generate rents on other crops or products than those that are exported by a producer (e.g., 
to multi-product firms). Nor can high border protection that is not associated with a 
formal support price system of the EC sugar type and export subsidy reduction 
commitments give rise to claims of illegal export subsidization.  
An important aspect of this case from an economic development perspective, 
while not relevant from a WTO law perspective, concerns the impact of the EC having to 
cut back exports significantly. Not only will domestic production have to fall 
substantially, the panel/AB findings imply that the EC cannot re-export the amount of 
imported ACP sugar back onto the world market. To maintain the current level of ACP 
imports, given a total export limit of 1.27 million tons, would require a very large cut in 
EC output. The needed cut is even larger if account is taken of the prospective additional 
sugar exports by LDCs to the EC under EBA. The 2006 CAP sugar reforms will lower 
intervention prices and reduce EC output, and substantially diminish the rents available 
for ACP sugar producers. A number of ACP producers will be forced to exit sugar 
production because they are too high cost. This will give rise to adjustment costs in these 
countries. Although the CAP reform embodies significant adjustment assistance for 
affected EC producers, the amount allocated to ACP producers for this purpose is limited. 
The fact that the EC did not “safeguard” the ACP sugar export volume in the 
reform of its sugar regime is an exogenous shock for the ACP that they could not have 
foreseen, even though it had been clear for some time that the EC was likely to change 
the program in the context of its decision to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements to 
replace the Cotonou convention, and that there would also be some “erosion” of rents as a 
result of the EBA initiative to grant duty-free, quota-free access to LDC exports of sugar 
as of 2009. Given that the source of the shock was the scheduling error (lack of 
scheduling of the ACP sugar quota), there would appear to be a case for the EC to make 
the ACP whole again.
17
                                                 
17 From a global welfare perspective, the appropriate response is arguably to use non-trade instruments to 
provide financial assistance to the ACP, i.e., to offset the loss created by the panel/AB decision. 
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